



Transforming Terrorism, Empowering Peace: Civil Society Responses to Evolving Terrorist Threats in Indonesia

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Abstract: This article discusses the shifting patterns of terrorist movements in Indonesia and the response of civil society coalitions in building peace networks. This issue is discussed because the acts of terrorism that have occurred since the first Bali Bombing in 2002 have undergone a transformation in the goals and targets of terror acts. The first generation of acts of terrorism in Indonesia was targeted as revenge against the United States government and its citizens as well as supporting coalition countries. Changes in the terror movement occurred by making the security forces the target of terror after the 2003 terrorism law was issued. This paper uses a qualitative method that explains data using content analysis methods. The results of this research reveal that an ethic of care that prioritizes empathy is the key to creating immunity to extremism in society. Immunity based on a sense of concern requires the synergy of civil society to work together to reduce the potential for radicalization in society.

Keywords: religious research; Penamas; religiosity, society; peace; terrorism

Article history: Received: June 01, 2025 | Revised: July 20, 2025 | Accepted: June 30, 2025 | Available online: June 30, 2025

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Introduction

The bombing of the Sari Club Discotheque and Paddy's Discotheque on Jalan Legian Kuta in Bali on October 12 2002, became the starting point for mention of acts of terrorism in Indonesia. The bomb explosion in Bali then spread through a network of terror movements and sympathizers of formless organizational cells to other regions in Indonesia. After the bombing in Legian Bali which killed 202 people, the JW Marriot Hotel in Kuningan, South Jakarta was bombed on 5 August 2003 and four other bomb explosions occurred simultaneously, namely the lobby of Wisma Bhayangkara Police Headquarters on 3 February 2003 and Soekarno Hatta airport on 27 April 2003.¹

The potential threat of terror bombs that is increasingly widespread influences specific handling strategies by the state. This reality demands the need for a separate legal umbrella outside of the existing types of criminal acts. This condition which is considered an emergency is one of the reasons for the issuance of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) Number 1 of 2022 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism. The Perppu, which was signed by Megawati Soekarnoputri on October 18 2002, contains 47 articles. The only regulation regarding terrorism was then stipulated as Law Number 15 of 2023 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2022 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism.²

The emergency situation arises from the absence of legal regulations related to terrorism, accompanied by the hasty nature of the formulation of the Terrorism Perppu. This is at least shown by the problematic definition of terrorism itself. An incident of violence or terror for one person is not necessarily considered an act of terrorism for another person or for state officials. Terrorism is generally defined as activities that have the aim of intimidating and causing panic in society, both individually and in groups with the intention of opposing the government. This understanding

¹ Muh. Khamdan, *Bina Damai Terorisme* (Kudus: Parist, 2015), 13.

² A. A. Subari, A. Razak, and B. Badaru, "Tindak Pidana Terorisme Dalam Sistem Peradilan Pidana," *Journal of Lex Theory (JLT)* 5, no. 2 (2024): 782–98; Jacqueline S. Hodgson and Victor Tadros, "The Impossibility of Defining Terrorism," *New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal* 16, no. 3 (2013): 494–526, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2013.16.3.494>; Yaser Esmailzadeh, "Defining Terrorism: Debates, Challenges, and Opportunities," *SSRN Electronic Journal* May 27 (2023), <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4461198>.

has the etymological meaning of an attitude of fear accompanied by the use of violence for political purposes.³

The various definitions of terrorism can at least be limited based on the elements of terrorism. This element is the existence of unlawful acts of violence, whether carried out by individuals, groups or by the state itself. Second, the target element of the object can affect people or property. Third, the action was carried out with the aim of intimidating the government and certain community groups. Fourth, the actions carried out have specific political objectives.⁴ All of these elements form a single unit to be categorized as terrorism.

Violent extremism is not immediately called terrorism. This is like the terror carried out by the Free Papua Organization (OPM), which tends to be referred to as an armed criminal group, so that the pattern of handling it is an ordinary crime. The violence and terror against state officials and society carried out by the OPM clearly has a political intention to liberate itself from Indonesia. Many fatalities along with other social disasters were followed by infrastructure damage due to OPM intimidation in the Papua region.⁵ This reality reinforces that labeling as a terrorist group or terrorist act still has subjectivity in some circles.

Terror and terrorism have actually existed since human existence, while undergoing transformation according to changing times. Terrorism, which is used as an enemy of all countries and all groups, in the history of its development cannot be separated from the interests of defining terrorism. Differences in perception regarding types of violence make it difficult to distinguish between ordinary criminal violence, separatist terror, political crime, organized crime, and dictatorships in power. Differences

³ Subari, Razak, and Badaru, "Tindak Pidana Terorisme Dalam Sistem Peradilan Pidana"; Alif Satria, "Two Decades of Counterterrorism in Indonesia: Successful Developments and Future Challenges," *2Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 14, no. 5 (2022): 7–16, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48687392%0A>.

⁴ Muh. Khamdan, "Pengembangan Bina Damai Dalam Penanganan Tindak Pidana Terorisme Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Cita Hukum* 4, no. 1 (2016): 105–32, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15408/jch.v4i1.2835>.

⁵ Tiara Devi Maharani and Aris Sarjito, "Separatist and Terrorist Movements in Papua: The Challenges of Social Disaster Management and the Important Role of Human-Made Disaster Intelligence," *Jurnal Pertahanan* 9, no. 3 (2023): 443–57, <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.33172/jp.v9i3.14659>; S. Eben Kirksey and J. A. D. Roemajauw, "The Wild Terrorist Gang: The Semantics of Violence and Self-Determination in West Papua," *Oxford Development Studies* 30, no. 2 (2002): 189–203, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/13600810220138294>.

in categorizing forms of violence as acts of terrorism are at least influenced by a number of conflicting interests in each country.

Indonesia, as a country with a very high level of social diversity, also experiences challenges in handling terrorism. The National Police through Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror (Densus 88 AT) in its enforcement operations tend to use repressive methods shown by the media. The practice of shooting to death outside a court decision or extrajudicial killing of a number of suspected terrorists has at least sparked criticism from some members of society. Ironically, these actions show the process of raids and sieges by Densus 88 AT through electronic media and other visualizations. Efforts to arrest and incapacitate suspected criminal acts of terrorism are considered not based on humanity or ignore the value of human rights.⁶

Militaristic actions that rely on the use of weapons have influenced the birth of new extremism as a psychology of revenge. Violent-based extremism emerges through transnational organizational networks and new movements that are separated from old networks, reinforced by displays of violence by the state itself.⁷ Cases of wrongful arrest of suspected terrorists, for example, occurred in more than 40 people in the period from 2003 to 2018. In the process of deaths outside of court decisions, in the same period at least more than 120 suspected terrorists were killed by state officials.⁸ The police force's policy formulation in terrorism operations which tends to be repressive has led to calls for revising the 2003 Terrorism Law.

Civil society certainly hopes that the National Police can arrest perpetrators of criminal acts of terrorism in accordance with humanitarian procedures and principles. Police discretion carried out by officers often leads to abuse of authority or abuse of power. Protests against this practice were carried out at least by religious-based civil society organizations, namely Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.

⁶ Bama Andika Putra, "Human Rights Concerns in Indonesia's Counterterrorism Policies: The Emergence of a Domestic Security Dilemma in Indonesia's Densus 88 Security Posture," *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies* 9, no. 6 (2020): 206–13, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.36941/ajis-2020-0125>.

⁷ Justiani Liem, Saurip Kadi, and Gregorius Neonbasu, "Human Right Violation Through State Terrorism in Indonesia, The Case of Millah Abraham Movement," *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 31, no. 5 (2023): 874–897, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-bja10149>.

⁸ Firmansyah and Arief Hidayat, "Pendekatan Advokasi Muhammadiyah Dalam Penanganan Terorisme Di Indonesia," *Journal of Political Issues* 2, no. 1 (2020): 10–20, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.33019/jpi.v.2i.18>.

Handling terrorism, which tends to be through hard power or the use of weapons because of the extra ordinary crime category, is recommended to change to soft power.⁹ The synergy between government officials and religious leaders in campaigning for an understanding of anti-radicalism is an illustration of awareness as well as a process of building public trust.¹⁰ Moreover, victims of wrongful arrest or stigmatization of suspected terrorist perpetrators seem to only be aimed at Muslims.¹¹

Suspects and perpetrators of violent extremism or acts of terrorism are basically part of civil society itself. Synergy in handling terrorism from the processes of prevention, protection, deradicalization, prosecution and correctional development is very much needed.¹² A soft power approach involving ulama and civil society groups or civil society organizations (CSO) is at least more effective in campaigning for an understanding of anti-radicalism to the community. Violent extremism is not caused by a particular religion, but rather by many interconnected factors. Community immunity to extremist ideology must be built from the community itself through strategic partnerships with various advocacy steps.

This study contributes to a new understanding of terrorism prevention and handling in two ways. First, this research combines a historical study of the shifting targets of terror in Indonesia (from foreign targets to security forces) with a practical study of the synergistic actions carried out by civil society, BNPT/BIN/Polri (National Counter-Terrorism Agency/State Intelligence Agency/National Police) at the grassroots

⁹ Muhammad Saekul Mujahidin, "Religious Moderation of Nadhlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in Combating Religious Radicalism in Indonesia," *El-Hekam* 8, no. 1 (2023): 1–19, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.28918/isjoust.v7i1.6966>; Muhammad Ainun Najib and Ahmad Khoiril Fata, "Islam Wasatiyah Dan Kontestasi Wacana Moderatisme Islam Di Indonesia," *Theologia* 31, no. 1 (2020): 115–38.

¹⁰ Imam Sopyan, Pepen Irpan Fauzan, and Ahmad Khoiril Fata, "Religious Harmony, Godly Nationalism, and the Limits of State-Sponsored Interreligious Dialogue Agenda in Indonesia," *Islamika Inside: Jurnal Keislaman Dan Humaniora* 6, no. 2 (2021): 31–53, <https://doi.org/10.35719/islamikainside.v6i2.113>; T. B. Hapsari, Muzayana, and F. Iqbal, "Deradicalisation or Moderation? (The Counter-Radicalism Framing of Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama in Indonesia)," *The Journal of International Communication* 29, no. 2 (2023): 196–212, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2023.2193569>.

¹¹ Fauzan and Ahmad Khoiril Fata, "Deconstructing the Concept of Jihad By the Radical Islamic Movements," in *1st Raden Intan International Conference on Muslim Societies and Social Sciences (RIICMuSSS 2019)* (Lampung: Atlantis Press, 2019), 253–57, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.201113.048>.

¹² Yaza Azzahara Ulyana et al., "Assessing the Effectiveness of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) in Indonesia," *International Journal of Advances in Social Sciences and Humanities* 2, no. 2 (2022): 121–31, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.56225/ijassh.v2i2.121>.

level. This combination of two studies is an approach combination that is still rarely undertaken comprehensively in terrorism studies. Second, this research uses a content-analysis approach to policy documents, legislation, and local community initiatives, with an emphasis on the role of the ethic of care, namely, empathy and social concern, as a protective factor against radicalization, which has not been widely explored in the literature evaluating P/CVE (Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism) that focuses more on technical interventions or rehabilitation programs (see the latest P/CVE evaluation review). By positioning the Indonesian experience within the framework of community resilience and reintegration practices, this study offers a theoretical contribution to the transnational discourse on the effectiveness of community-based strategies in preventing extremist violence.

Methods

This paper examines the relationship between civil society coalitions in peace networks facing shifting patterns of terrorist movements in Indonesia. The phenomenon of changing terror targets and the formation of terror network cells is at least influenced by the handling strategies of government officials and civil society. Therefore, this paper uses a qualitative method that explains the data descriptively. This means that the data construction process is understood as the result of interpretations that have plural dimensions or depend on the analytical point of view.

The primary sources used in this paper are documents relating to shifts in the pattern of terrorist movements as well as synergistic activities of civil society with government officials in handling terrorism in Indonesia. The data processing is carried out using the content analysis method using the descriptive analytic method. This method is carried out by examining patterns in communication and the meaning of code and content quantitatively and qualitatively. The stages of the research method include the process of decomposing data, the process of comparing, the process of grouping and sorting, and the process of connecting one data to another. A series of research steps are combined through an interpretation stage which allows for a number of new data to be added to complement or eliminate other data. The social criticism approach is used with an inductive thinking framework while remaining based on the suitability of the results from triangulation of research data.

Results and Discussion

Shifting Patterns of Terrorist Movements in Indonesia

The transformation of terrorism in Indonesia can at least be mapped by shifts in movement patterns based on the 2003 Terrorism Law. In the international world, regulations on terrorism were only agreed on November 16 1937. The international agreement on terrorism as a transnational criminal crime is regulated in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (Convention) or better known as the 1937 Geneva Convention.¹³ The convention agreed upon by members of the League of Nations was signed by France, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Peru, Estonia and Venezuela.¹⁴

Romania became the initiator of the convention by first proposing it to the League of Nations in 1926. The proposal that emerged after World War I on 28 July 1914 – 11 November 1918 positioned the crime of terrorism as a separate crime. This at least requires that every country can make terrorism a crime that is different from political crimes or war crimes. The 1937 Geneva Convention did not operate as positive international law because of World War II in 1939-1945. Germany under Nazi rule built a military alliance with Italy and Japan and carried out invasions of a number of countries. Germany's alliance steps faced France, England and the Netherlands along with colonial colonies throughout the world.¹⁵

1. Theological Solidarity and Expression of the Jihad Movement

Acts of violence carried out by a number of countries influence acts of terror carried out individually and in communities. Ottoman Turkey's involvement in the German-Austrian-Italian triple alliance coalition in World War I, experienced defeat by the Anglo-French-Russian triple entente alliance. As a consequence, Palestine, which used to be part of the Levantine Province under the Ottoman Turks, had to transfer control to Britain through the Clemanceau Lloyd George agreement in

¹³ Hana Fairuz Mestika, "Terrorism and Islam in the Global Perspective," *Indonesian Journal of Counter Terrorism and National Security* 2, no. 1 (2023): 147–78, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15294/ijctns.v2i1.66163>.

¹⁴ Martin David Dubin, "Great Britain and the Anti-Terrorist Conventions of 1937," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5, no. 1 (1993): 1–29, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/09546559308427194>.

¹⁵ Muh Khamdan, *Politik Identitas Dan Perebutan Hegemoni Kuasa: Kontestasi Dalam Politik Elektoral Di Indonesia* (Serang: A-Empat, 2022), 127.

1918.¹⁶ The occupation of the British Anglican Christian Kingdom, which was followed by the migration of European Jewish groups to Palestine, continued with the establishment of the state of Israel on May 14 1948 on Palestinian land.¹⁷ The dynamics of the Palestinian occupation have at least given rise to the epicenter of global terrorism and jihadist ideological networks.

The failure of a number of Muslim rulers to defend their territory from the Western World has become the driving force for the birth of a number of civil society political movements based on theological solidarity. Hasan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, for example, founded the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) in April 1928 in Egypt. The IM was founded to carry out cultural politics as well as religious politics as a response to the aftermath of the British occupation of Egypt in 1922. A number of countries neighboring Egypt were still colonial colonies contested between England, France and Italy, under the pretext of a League of Nations mandate.¹⁸

The construction of a resistance identity emerged among some Muslim circles to fight against colonial power holders. The resistance movement builds a certain collective identity, supported by psychological similarities as a threatened entity. The existence of feelings about a common enemy within IM, for example, was encouraged by ideologue Sayyid Qutb who suggested armed resistance.¹⁹ On 29 August 1966, Qutb was sentenced to death by the Egyptian government which had an impact on the transformation of jihadist ideology into a variant of the movement. There are at least three main figures who continued Qutb's ideology.²⁰ First, Syukri

¹⁶ Sneha Reddy, "Archives and Trails from the First World War: Repurposing Imperial Records of North African and Indian Soldiers in Palestine and Syria, 1917-1923," *Archives and Manuscripts* 48, no. 2 (2020): 157-70, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/01576895.2020.1766985>.

¹⁷ Doron Bar, "The Changing Identity of Muslim/Jewish Holy Places in the State of Israel, 1948-2018," *Middle Eastern Studies* 59, no. 1 (2022): 139-50, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2022.2047655>.

¹⁸ Mubashar Hasan, "Beyond Clash of Civilizations and Post-Islamism: Ummah(s) and the Muslim World," in *Islam and Politics in Bangladesh*, 2020, 29-55, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1116-5_2; Omar Gomaa, "Hassan Al-Banna and His Modern Political Islam," *International Journal of Social Science And Human Research* 5, no. 8 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.47191/ijsshr/v5-i8-04>.

¹⁹ Maryam Anwar, "Comparative Analysis of The Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah," *International Journal of Policy Studies* 3, no. 2 (2023): 62-75.

²⁰ Ahmad Khoirul Fata and Muh Khamdan, "Jihad Global: Ideologi Dan Jaringan Di Indonesia," *Kontemplasi: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin* 9, no. 2 (2021): 205-26, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.21274/kontem.2021.9.2.205-226>.

Musthofa formed a jihadist faction within IM called Jamaah Al Muslimin or known as Jamaah Takfir wal Hijrah. Second, Ismail At-Thanthawi founded Jamaah Jihad or Tanzimul Jihad in 1970 and continued by Ayman Az-Zawahiri in 1993. Third, Umar Abdurrahman founded Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah in 1973.²¹ The global ideology of jihad is developing that the application of Allah's law is a necessity, so that governments that are infidel or not based on Allah's law must be replaced or fought.

Theological solidarity with Muslims who were colonized by infidels in some areas was strengthened by the traumatic feeling of the Palestinian war with Israel. Theological solidarity encourages a spirit of resistance to reduce Western dominance and the invasion of infidel governments. This reality has given rise to the development of violent extremism in the world. The momentum for strengthening the global jihad network was at least driven by a number of events, such as the Soviet Union's military invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the attempt to exterminate the Bosnian Muslim ethnic group by Serbia in 1992, the war over territory between the Indian Hindu government and Pakistani Muslims in Khasmir, and the United States military invasion of Iraq after the World Trade Center (WTC) bombing in New York on September 11, 2001.

2. Retaliation against the United States and the Coalition Countries

The United States declared war on terrorism after the 9/11 WTC bombings. Ironically, the narrative of the war on terrorism is intended to invade Muslim-populated countries that previously dared to oppose US interests. The military invasion of Afghanistan was carried out by the US on the orders of George W. Bush on October 7 2001. The military occupation operation had the pretext of attacking the Al-Qaeda organization and the Afghan Taliban government, because they were considered the actors in the WTC bombing and a number of vital United States objects.²² The US accusation is based on an Al-Qaeda fatwa in 1998 that called for killing Americans and their allies, in retaliation for crimes against Muslims.

²¹ Adnan A. Musallam, "The Posthumous Impact of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) on Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Global Jihadists of Al-Qa'eda," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 2 (2020):1–13, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1353/jsa.2020.0002>.

²² Guillaume Beaud, "Afghanistan Since 2001: US Geostrategic Ambitions, a Failed State, and the Return of the Taliban," SciencesPo, 2023, <https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-04240466v1>.

The Al-Qaeda fatwa as a statement of jihad against Jews and Crusaders was signed by Osama bin Laden as the leader of Al-Qaeda, along with four other mujahideen alliance figures on 23 February 1998.²³ The four mujahideen alliances consist of Ayman Al Zawahiri representing the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Abu Yasir Rifai Ahmad Taha representing the Egyptian Al-Jami'ah Al-Islamiyah, Syaikh Mir Hamzah representing the Pakistani Jami'atul Ulama, and Fazlur Rahman representing the Bangladesh Islamic Jihad Harakatul. The 1998 mujahideen alliance fatwa was obeyed by at least some of the mujahideen networks belonging to Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia.

The US military invasion of Afghanistan, which was considered a unilateralist action or a one-sided policy without respecting the rules of international law, gave rise to acts of revenge globally. The embryo of revenge by some members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) against the US and its allies was marked by the Bali Bombing I in October 2002, which killed 202 people from 22 countries. Each of them is Australia with 88 people, Indonesia with 38 people, England with 23 people, United States with 7 people, Germany with 6 people, Sweden with 5 people, France and the Netherlands with 4 people each, Denmark and Switzerland each 3 people, Brazil, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa and South Korea 2 people each, as well as 1 person from Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Taiwan.

The first Bali Bombing terror action was carried out by members of the Singapore and Malaysian regional JI or known as Mantiqi I led by Mukhlas alias Ali Ghufron. Mantiqi I tended to follow the direction of the central Markaziyah warlord named Hambali. This attitude resulted in differences with Amir JI and the other 3 Mantiqi in responding to Osama's jihad fatwa. Mantiqi II, led by Abu Irsyad alias Syahroni, has regional areas in Java and Sumatra. Mantiqi III, led by Nasir Abbas, has the regional areas of Sabah, Kalimantan, Eastern Indonesia and the Philippines. Meanwhile, Mantiqi IV was led by Abdurrahim Ayub with the Australian regional region.²⁴

After the Bali Bombing I, activism in the war against terrorism led by the US and supported by NATO member countries seemed to be justified. Indonesian security

²³ Lucian Buciu, "Al Qaeda and Hyperterrorism, The Successful Emergence of Binladenism At Global Level," in *Proceedings of the 17th International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI*, 2021, 74–79, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.53477/2668-2001-21-08>.

²⁴ V Arianti, "Jemaah Islamiyah's Hierarchical Structure: Security Implications for Indonesia," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 13, no. 3 (2021):15–21, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27040262>.

forces were able to uncover the case by releasing three sketches of the perpetrator's face on October 30 2002. One of the main suspects, Amrozi bin Nur Hasyim, was arrested in Tenggulun village, Lamongan, East Java on November 5 2002. A day later, 10 other suspects were arrested simultaneously from a number of regions, based on a relationship of mutual assistance in planning and executing blasts. Successively, the core explosives team was arrested, namely Imam Samudra was caught on 17 November 2002 in Banten, while Mukhlas alias Ali Ghufron, who was Amrozi's older brother, was caught with his younger brother, Ali Imron, on 3 December 2002 in Klaten. The death penalty was handed down to Amrozi, Imam Samudera, and Mukhlas in October 2003.²⁵

Hambali, who was the action mentor for the Mantiqi I mujahideen members, was caught in a joint anti-terror operation in Thailand in August 2003.²⁶ The targets of the counterattack continued to be led by members assisted by Mantiqi I, namely Noordin M Top and dr. Azahari Husin. The bomb that exploded at the JW Marriot Hotel in August 2003, for example, killed 11 people and more than 152 people suffered traumatic injuries due to terror. The terror continued with a bomb in front of the Australian Embassy on September 9 2004 which resulted in the deaths of 9 people and the injuries of hundreds of people.

The target of revenge against the US and assets belonging to its citizens is still the main motive for the JI network's terror acts. The bomb terror was repeated in Bali on October 1 2005, with the explosion of RAJA's Bar in Kuta and Nyoman Café in Jimbaran which killed 22 people and injured around 102 people. A month later, Anti-Terror Densus 88 succeeded in arresting Dr. Azhari during the siege in Batu, Malang on November 9 2005. The siege carried out by the National Police's Black Swallow Crisis Response Team (CRT), numbering 12 people, resulted in Dr. Azhari died.²⁷

The leadership of the JI terror network cell was continued by Noordin M. Top. Revenge efforts were made by making the JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton Hotels in Jakarta terror targets. The suicide bombing occurred on July 17 2009, with 9

²⁵ Fata and Khamdan, "Jihad Global: Ideologi Dan Jaringan Di Indonesia."

²⁶ See Matt Cianflone, Jason Cull, and John Fisher, *Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: An in-Depth Investigation into the 2002 Bali, Indonesia, Bombings* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2007).

²⁷ Fata and Khamdan, "Jihad Global: Ideologi Dan Jaringan Di Indonesia."

people dead and 53 people injured. The enforcement processes carried out by Polri 88 resulted in the death of Noordin M Top in a raid in Mojosongo, Solo, on 17 September 2009. The arrest of Dr. Azhari and Noordin M Top by the Indonesian security forces influenced the transformation of the direction of the terror movement aimed at attacking government officials.²⁸

3. Retaliation against Indonesian Security Forces

The terror network cells that were disintegrated due to the loss of command were mobilized by Dulmatin in the spirit of revenge from the security forces. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who holds the position of Amir JI, always refuses recognition because he founded and led Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). The mobilization of terrorist cells is at least a kind of reunion of Afghan mujahideen alumni in military training in Bukit Janto, Aceh, since mid-2009. This cross-group para-military training or tanzim is thought to involve involvement with a bomb assembly expert and JI training field commander named Umar Patek, Abu Tholut, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, and Abdullah Sunata.²⁹

Dulmatin succeeded in uniting many militias through training in Aceh. Therefore, there was an effort to establish Tanzim Al-Qaeda Serambi Makkah to give the impression that the cross-tanzim group was on the same level as Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden.³⁰ A number of militias include JI, JAT, the Dulmatin network, the Banten group as the West Java Darul Islam faction, the DI faction commanded by Enceng Kurnia, the former NII, the KOMPAK mujahideen part of the DI Sulawesi faction, the Lampung mujahideen and other mujahideen factions. The merging of terror network cells certainly posed a very serious threat, until it was finally revealed by the authorities on February 22 2010.

Dulmatin's greatness and danger in being able to mobilize the mujahideen network and Umar Patek's field command skills were recognized by a number of countries. The US created a competition by promising a reward of 10 million US dollars for those who capture or provide important information for Dulmatin's arrest. The competition related to Umar Patek was awarded a prize of 1 million US dollars related to his arrest or providing information to arrest him. Dulmatin was

²⁸ Fata and Khamdan.

²⁹ Fata and Khamdan.

³⁰ See Fitriani, Alif Satria, and Pricilia Putri Nirmala Sari, *The Current State of Terrorism in Indonesia: Vulnerable Groups, Networks, and Responses* (Jakarta: CSIS, 2018).

killed by Densus 88 AT in an ambush at an internet cafe in Pamulang, South Tangerang, on March 9 2010. The success of the National Police in arresting Dulmatin at least influenced Umar Patek to leave Indonesia via the Philippines to Pakistan. On January 25 2011, Umar Patek was captured alive in Abbotabad, Pakistan, on January 25 2011, and returned to Indonesia. In the same city, Osama bin Laden was captured by US troops on May 2 2011.

The siege of paramilitary terrorist training in Aceh, the death of Dulmatin, and the capture of Umar Patek resulted in terrorist networks in Indonesia increasingly being scattered into small cells. Network cells in western Indonesia such as Lampung, Banten, Jabodetabek and West Java founded the West Indonesian Mujahideen (MIB) led by Abu Roban. Meanwhile, a network cell in eastern Indonesia founded the East Indonesian Mujahideen (MIT) led by Santoso in 2012. The main target of the post-Dulmatin terror generation turned into small terror attacks on security forces or civil society who interacted with the police.

MIB was able to be paralyzed more quickly by the police with the death of Abu Roban in an ambush in Batang, Central Java, on 8 May 2013. MIT took longer to deal with it because internally there were network factions, even though in 2012 they appointed Santoso as Amir. The UN Security Council under the Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee declared MIT a terrorist organization on September 29 2015. The Santoso-Basri faction was successfully crushed on July 18 2016 with the death of Santoso and his members in the Tambarana Mountains, Poso Pesisir Utara. Another MIT faction led by Ali Kalora, which was more frequently involved in firefights with security forces, ended up being crushed in September 2022.

Synergy of Civil Society and Peace Network

The handling of terrorism from 2002 until the end of the MIT network led by Santoso in Poso, did not reduce the potential threat of terrorism in Indonesia. Deradicalization efforts within correctional institutions (prisons) and outside require synergy from all groups and a number of resources. The weakness in implementing the 2003 Terrorism Law, for example, is that it has not adapted to new types of crimes that continue to develop. Cyber crime, for example, makes criminal law seem to be lagging behind or not yet accommodating new crime phenomena. In acts of terrorism, the involvement of children and women is a leap case that is not yet regulated in the Terrorism Law. The shift in the terrorist movement involving children and women

demands the importance of considering the ethics of care, namely responsiveness to pay attention to the impact of losing connection with oneself or with others.

The psychopolitics of society related to the phenomenon of crime and legal regulations basically focus on protecting human rights (HAM) for citizens. Therefore, the challenge regarding the effectiveness of the Terrorism Law regulations will be measured based on humanitarian indicators in strategies for preventing and handling criminal terrorism. The revision of the Terrorism Law is not only aimed at eradicating terrorism, but also concerns aspects of prevention, response, recovery of victims, responsible institutional institutions and monitoring mechanisms. Such demands emerged as a reaction from the civil society coalition which saw that the security forces' actions tended to display violent tendencies.

In the handling of terror acts in Indonesia, there are at least very clear differences between before and after the 2003 Terrorism Law. Before the Terrorism Law, all the perpetrators of the 2002 Bali Bombing could be captured alive with sufficient evidence and confessions or defenses in court. This is different from the handling after the Terrorism Law was implemented, raids were often broadcast live by the mass media and ended with the suspected terrorist being captured dead. Enforcement steps often result in shooting dead suspected terrorists outside of a court decision (extrajudicial killing) or wrongly arresting them with torture.³¹

Civil society synergy encourages strengthening cross-agency cooperation in the prevention or de-radicalization process. Prevention that focuses on overcoming the roots of the growth of violent extremism is carried out simultaneously by elements of civil society. The coaching model outside prison with a civil society approach is an effective step to accelerate the process of resocialization of former terrorism convicts and immunity from violence for society. A space for good social interaction must be built by all components of civil society, because government programs often raise suspicion.

The target objects that must be worked on by civil society coalitions can be categorized into 3 main clusters. First, the general public based on the community as well as the professional ecosystem and living environment. Second, formal and non-formal educational institutions to carry out counter-radicalization as well as

³¹ Jaka Susila, "Globalization of Terrorism and Extra-Judicial Killings: The Paradox of Human Rights in Indonesia," *The Indonesian Journal of Legal Thought* 1, no. 1 (2021): 43–55.

building immunity to thinking that leads to violent extremism. Third, former terrorism convicts and network cells in society. The post prison program, which has not been officially prepared by the government, is an opportunity for civil society coalitions to play a bigger role.

A number of civil society organizations often work together in community advocacy on the issue of violent extremism. One of the consortiums that was formed was the Civil Society Against Violent Extremism (C-Save), which was established on June 5 2017 to advocate for the Terrorism Bill. The consortium consists of The Habibie Center (THC), Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR), Indonesian Muslim Crisis Center (IMC2), Institute for Community Studies and Advocacy (Elsam), Islamic Learning Community, Peace Prasasti Foundation, Asian Muslim Action Network Indonesia (AMAN Indonesia), Search for Common Ground, and the Center for the Study of Radicalism and Deradicalization.

Since the 2018 Terrorism Law came into force, the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) has formed Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forums (FKPT) which are spread across all cities in Indonesia. The civil society coalition in the form of FKPT was formed based on the mandate of BNPT Regulation Number 1 of 2022 concerning the Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forum. This forum is dedicated as a partner in strategies for preventing terrorism in the region. Efforts to prevent acts of terrorism can be formulated into three strategies, namely national preparedness, counter-deradicalization and de-radicalization.

Preparedness is intended as a government effort to carry out prevention through broad public education, increasing the capacity of state officials, developing facilities and infrastructure, increasing the capacity of terrorism study institutions, and mapping areas prone to radical terrorism as risk mitigation measures. This series of activities is an early detection effort by the government to anticipate the threat of terrorism appropriately and effectively. National preparedness mandates comprehensive action involving all government resources and elements of society.

Counter-radicalization is focused on dealing with people or communities who are vulnerable to exposure to violent extremism. A number of activities can be carried out by the government directly or with community participation, namely risk identification or assessment, intensive monitoring of terrorist networks, investigation of criminal acts of terrorism, monitoring the flow of funding for acts of terrorism, media literacy to counter the issue of radicalization, monitoring facilities and infrastructure for planned terror acts, and fostering peace ambassadors. Counter-radicalization

intellectual strategies must be balanced with a sense of empathy and concern for building social cohesion.

In the deradicalization strategy, the government and civil society coalition can go through a number of stages. First, identification or assessment to describe the level of exposure to or involvement in terrorist group cells and networks, as well as identifying a person's level of radical terrorism. Second, rehabilitation which functions for recovery or healing in reducing a person's radical level. Third, re-education which is intended as a step to educate or strengthen someone so that they can abandon the radical ideology of terrorism. Fourth, social reintegration through a series of activities to facilitate people exposed to radical ideology to return to their families and be accepted in society.

The success of deradicalization of terrorism convicts has characteristics of success which are marked by a tendency to be willing to accept financial assistance, easily provide information, be open to exchanging opinions, and recognize Pancasila as the basis of the Indonesian state.³¹ Names such as Ali Imron, Muhammad Rais, Mubarok, Idris, and Purnama Putra alias Usman are images of former terrorist militants who are willing to accept deradicalization programs from within prisons through personality development and independence development strategies.

A number of Afghan mujahideen alumni have been one of the factors in the success of deradicalization so far. This reality is marked by a willingness to receive capital assistance from the government, both from the police and from BNPT to open a trading business based on region and business management skills. Idris, M. Rais, and Usman received parole (PB) and can live an ordinary life in society. Idris opened a transportation and car rental business in the Bogor area, M. Rais opened a cellphone buying and selling business in the Pekanbaru area, while Usman continued his master's studies and worked in Jakarta.

Conclusion

The success of the National Police through Densus 88 in solving a number of terrorism cases using various modes and changing patterns, has received appreciation from various parties. The effectiveness of disclosing the perpetrators in the bomb terror series, for example, is supported by information cooperation from the community

³¹ Khamdan, *Bina Damai Terorisme*.

itself. In the case of the Bali Bomb I, for example, the disclosure of the parties involved was supported by the confessions of JI members other than Mantiqi I members. The problem arose when the Terrorism Law was available which gave full authority to the police to carry out the handling. A number of arrests and ambushes tend to be accompanied by wrongful arrests, assaults and shooting deaths. The celebration of violence carried out by Densus 88 did not have a deterrent effect, but instead aroused feelings of revenge and a loss of sympathy among some people towards Densus 88. The transformation of the terrorist movement, which initially targeted the government and citizens of the US and coalition countries, turned into revenge against Indonesian government officials. The terror carried out by the remaining network cells becomes less quality even though the quantity increases. The arrests carried out by the authorities against military training alumni of the Poso terrorist network and the South Sulawesi DI network, for example, have become a fairly long series of retaliations because they only end in 2022. The authorities' firm actions clearly have a huge influence in minimizing vigilante action or the use of other methods. -the violent methods of the troops of radical Islamic organizations. However, civil society synergy has an important role to play in creating immunity from violent extremism ideologies. The deradicalization program as part of the official BNPT program can actually be effectively implemented systematically with the involvement of civil society in stages and based on residential areas. It is not yet clear how the structured program design will be carried out on an ongoing basis, but it is still based on the initiative of each civil society group. Preventive measures to reduce the potential for terror to occur in the name of religion or other interests must be carried out continuously and in an integrated manner. All agencies, community leaders, community organizations and security forces must aggressively carry out early detection through well-structured risk mitigation. However, the authors recognize that this research has limitations due to the fact that it is based on document analysis (content analysis) and secondary sources. Consequently, this study does not include primary field data (e.g., in-depth interviews with former convicts, law enforcement officials, or local NGOs), thereby limiting the depth of understanding of individual experiences and micro-social dynamics within the deradicalization process. Furthermore, this study is still focused on national/organizational initiatives and documentation, meaning its findings cannot be immediately generalized and applied to the context of other countries. These limitations open up opportunities for other researchers to conduct quantitative-comparative research or field research based on direct interviews/observations to test and enrich the findings.

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